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FALL 1963]
THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE




T HE COURT OF JUSTICE of the European Communities, thecommon judicial organ of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC, better known as
the Common Market), and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), has in 1963 entered its second decade of operation. This
Court, located in Luxembourg, began to function in 1953' as the
Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community. When
in 1958 the Common Market and Euratom were established, it was
transformed into the Court of the European Communities. The "new"
Court took over from its predecessor, the majority of the judges, most
of the other personnel, its physical plant, and its docket of nearly forty
cases.
2
The Court is composed of seven judges. While in principle the
Court sits in plenary session, it is authorized to set up chambers com-
posed of three to five judges. The Court, in fact, has made use of this
authorization and has established two chambers of three judges each.3
The basic task of the Court is to ensure the observance of law in
the interpretation and application of the Treaties underlying the three
European Communities. In the discharge of this responsibility the
Court is aided by two advocates-general whose functions are "to present
publicly, with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned con-
clusions on cases submitted to the Court of Justice with a view to
assisting the latter in the performance of its duties. . . .-" The advocates-
t LL.B., 1933, University of Berlin; Ph.D., 1962, Tulane University. AssociateProfessor of Political Science; Acting Chairman, Department of Political Science and
Economics, Moorhead State College, .Moorhead, Minnesota.
1. The first judges of the Court were appointed on December 2, 1952.
2. 1 Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften 453, October 19, 1958 [herein-
after cited as Amtsblatt] ; 2 Amtsblatt 467-68, November 11, 1959.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25,
1957, art. 137 [hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 166 [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18,
1951, art. 32 [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty.]
4. Euratom Treaty, art. 138; EEC Treaty, art. 166; ECSC Treaty, art. 32a.
(37)
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general represent in no way either the Communities or the public; they
function only in the interests of justice. Although the institution of the
advocate-general is unknown in the common law systems, it is used
extensively in French administrative law procedure. In fact, the
advocate-general in the judicial organization of the Communities is
modeled after the Government Commissioner of the French Conseil
d'Etat, the most important of the French administrative courts and the
apex of the French administrative court system.5
Since the origins, powers, and objectives of the three European
Communities are contained in international treaties signed by the six
Member governments,' the Court, a creation of these treaties, has
basically the character of an international tribunal. However, the
competences assigned the Court by the three Treaties go far beyond the
jurisdictional powers normally possessed by an international tribunal
in the traditional sense. Indeed, the Court's role as an administrative
and a constitutional tribunal has been much more significant than its
role as an international tribunal. Moreover, the Treaties have conferred
upon the Court in certain instances civil jurisdiction in a common law
sense and in other cases have assigned to it the functions of a disciplinary
court and of an arbitration tribunal. Access to the Court is not limited
to the usual subjects of international law, the governments of states, but
is also afforded to private persons-natural and legal-affected by
the Treaties as well as to some of the institutions of the Communities.7
The judgments of the Court can be enforced against private parties in
the Member States in the same manner as those of the national courts.
Enforcement of judgments against governments of the Member States
is only possible under the ECSC Treaty which provides the imposition
5. See DELVAUX, LA COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNAUT- EUROPAENE DU
CHARBON ET DE L'AciER 14 (1956). Mr. Delvaux is one of the justices of the Court.
For additional information see SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE
COMMON LAW WORLD 23-41, 138-39 (1954); VALENTINE, THE COURT OFt JUSTICE OF
THz EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMuNITY 44-48 (1955).
6. Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
7. Cf., Euratom Treaty, arts. 126(2), 141-49, 151-54; EEC Treaty, arts. 157(2),
169-76, 178-82; ECSC Treaty, arts. 12(2), 33-42, 89(2). See also BEBR, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 22 (1962); Stein, The New Institutions,
in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, A LEGAL PROFILE
70-71 (Stein & Nicholson eds. 1960); WOHLFARTH, EVERLING, GLAESNER & SPRUNG,
DIE EUROPAEISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT, KOMMENTAR ZUM VERTRAG 473,
Preliminary Comments No. 3 before Article 164 (1960) ; van Houtte (Registrar of the
Court), La Cour de Justice de la Communauti Europiene du Charbon et de i'Acier,
in 2 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 183-222. Advocate-General Maurice Lagrange in La Cour
de Justice de la CECA, REVUE DU DROrT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 417,
distinguishes only between two broad categories, namely, the competence of an
administrative and of a constitutional court. VALENTINE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 65-69
and DAIG, DIE GERICHTSBARKEIT DER EUROPAEISCHEN WIRTSCHAPTSGEMEINSCHAT
UND DER EUROPAEISCHEN ATOMGEMEINSCHAFT, ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS
132-208 (1958) analyze the competence of the Court in great detail, but do not
establish any broad categories of jurisdiction.
[VOL. 9 : p. 37
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of sanctions under certain conditions; the EEC and Euratom Treaties,
however, have dispensed with the sanction procedure.8
From its inception until the end of the 1962-63 term in July of
1963, the Court has rendered 103 decisions and opinions and at the
time of adjournment nearly eighty cases were pending. In an appraisal
of the case law developed by the Court up to 1960, Mr. Maurice La-
grange, one of the two advocates-general, declared that one striking
fact stood out clearly: "The Court's role has been undoubtedly more
important than had been foreseen; and, above all, it has been consider-
ably different from that which had been visualized originally."9 This
statement of Mr. Lagrange applies to an even greater extent today; the
judgments rendered by the Court since the end of 1960 have further
enhanced the position of importance which the Court occupies within
the Community of the six Member States, especially as far as economic
developments are concerned.
Many of the opinions which the Court has filed over the years
have affected private enterprises in the Member countries and have
often involved large sums of money, occasionally running into the
millions of dollars.10 Some of the decisions have resulted in profound
economic changes with actual and potential social implications for cer-
tain population groups.11 Others have dealt with the legality of gov-
ernmental actions of the Member States; in several judgments the
8. Euratom Treaty, arts. 159, 164; EEC Treaty, arts. 187, 192; ECSC Treaty,
arts. 44, 88, 92.
9. Lagrange, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as
Seen Through Its Case Law, LAW & CONTZMP. PROB. 400, 416 (1961).
10. An outstanding example of such a decision is Mannesmann AG v. High
Authority, supported by Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG, (No. 19/61) July 13, 1962, 8
Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes [hereinafter cited as Sammlung]
717 [19621. This decision was one of many arising out of the application of a system
of subsidy payments for the equalization of the cost of scrap metal when this
material was in short supply during the middle 1950's, and the world market price
was high. Although the system was discontinued in 1958 when ample supplies of
scrap metal became available, litigations as to the liability for these payments and
their size continued, and even today forty-seven cases pertaining to the final settle-
ment of outstanding payments are still pending before the Court (List of Cases
pending before the Court, June 17, 1963). For additional information and other
cases see BXBR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 62-64.
11. E.g., F~ldration Charbonnigre de Belgique v. High Authority, (No. 8/55) July
16, 1956, November 29, 1956, [1955-56], 2 Sammlung 155, 197; Societe des Charbon-
nages de Beeringen v. High Authority, (No. 9/55) December 12, 1956, 2 Sammlung 331[1955-56]. These decisions sustained the first phase of the High Authority's long-
range plan to make the Belgian coal industry more efficient. This plan included
the closing of some of the Bplgian mines in which efficiency could not be sufficiently
improved with the result ,that some of the Belgian miners were thrown out of work
and had to be retrained for other occupations. Several decisions of the Court also
dealt with the running conflict between the High Authority and the German Ruhr
coal industry. The former would like to break up the strong cartelization of the
sales activities for Ruhr coal, whereas the latter claims that too much competition
might have deleterious effects upon the German coal miners. See, e.g., Ruhrkohlen-
verkaufsgesellschaften "Geitling", "Mausegatt" & "President" v. High Authority,(Nos. 16-18/59) February 12, 1960, 6/1 Sammlung 45 [1960]. See also DIMnOLD,
Tug SCHUMAN PLAN (1959) 200-16, 380-93.
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Court has found such actions to contravene the Community law found
in the Treaties, and, interestingly enough, the governments concerned
have never refused to comply with rulings of the Court. 12 Finally, in
three fairly recent instances the Court was requested by national tri-
bunals in the Member States to issue rulings on the interpretation and
application of the EEC Treaty which were then used as a basis for
deciding cases pending before the national courts.' In view of the
far-reaching significance which the Court has obviously assumed for
governments and private individuals alike in the Member States, one
may be justified in asking who are the justices wielding such extensive
power and responsibility. How are they appointed and under what
conditions can they be removed from office? What are their duties and
privileges, and what measure of judicial independence do they possess?
The exploration of these and other questions concerning the justices




In contrast to the specialized qualifications an individual must
possess in France and in other Member States for appointment to
judgeship on the highest court, the three Treaties use merely a general
formula which states: "The judges ... shall be chosen from among
persons of indisputable independence who fulfill the conditions re-
quired for the holding of the highest office in their respective country
or who are jurists of recognized competence."' 4 (Emphasis added.)
This formula is in keeping with the Statute of the International Court
12. E.g., EEC Commission v. The Government of the Republic of Italy, (No.
10/61) February 27, 1962, 8 Sammlung 1. Italy had applied to radio parts imported
from Member States a higher tariff than was justified by the tariff in force on
January 1, 1958, the date which was to be used for the calculation of the progressive
tariff reductions mandatory for the realization of the Common Market. A very recent
decision sustains the EEC Commission against a complaint by the Federal Republic of
Germany that its quota granted by the Commission for the import of oranges from
countries other than Common Market members was too small. (No. 34-62, July 15,
1963, mimeographed advance copy.) Thus, decisions of the Court may even have im-
plications for the external relations of the Community.
13. E.g., Request for a Preliminary Ruling by the Court of Appeals at The
Hague (Netherlands) in the matter of Kledingverkoopbedrijf De Geus v. Robert
Bosch GmbH, (No. 13/61) April 6, 1962, 8 Sammlung 97 [1962]. This was a very
important judgment which pertained to the interpretation and application of the anti-
trust provisions of the EEC Treaty. For an excellent analysis of this judgment see
Jeantet, Observation sous l'arret de la Cour du 6 Avril 1962, JURIS-CLASSEUR
PJRIODIQUp No. 24, June 13, 1962. The effect of this decision upon the private cor-
porations doing business is far-reaching. Another very significant judgment of the
Court, highly favorable to European integration, can be found in Request for a
Preliminary Ruling by the Tariff Commission in Amsterdam (Netherlands) in the
matter of van Gend & Loos v. The Finance Administration of the Netherlands, (No.
26/62) February 5, 1962, 9 Sammlung 1 [1963].
14. Euratom Treaty, art. 139; EEC Treaty, art. 167; ECSC Treaty, art. 32b.
[VOL. 9 : p. 37
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/4
FALL 1963] JUDGES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
of Justice at The Hague which stipulates in Article 2 that the Court is
to be composed of a "body of independent judges," elected from among
persons "of high moral character, who possess the qualifications re-
quired in their country for appointment to the highest judicial offices
or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."' 5
Prior to the establishment of the EEC and Euratom the pertinent
provisions of the ECSC Treaty with regard to the qualifications for
appointment to judgeship were even less stringent. The only require-
ments for appointment were "recognized independence and competence."
As a consequence, it was possible for an individual without formal
legal training to become a justice of the Court and two of the original
judges appeared to have been "non-jurists."' 6 Today these two men
are no longer members of the Court and all appointees must at least
have a law degree, although it is not necessary for them to have had
prior experience on the bench or to possess the specific, technical qualifi-
cations required for appointment to judicial office in their country.' 7
The Treaties are silent about the nationality of the appointees
for a judgeship. Since according to explicit provisions in the Treaties
the members of the executive organs - the ECSC High Authority
and the EEC and Euratom Commissions - must be nationals of the
Member States,' some writers have concluded that such a requirement
does not apply to the judges of the Court, and that therefore a national
of any state may be appointed as a justice.' 9 However, the validity of
the argument e contrario is open to serious doubt since the judges, in
a broad sense, are civil servants of the Communities and the personnel
statutes specify that normally only nationals of the Member States can
be given a permanent civil service appointment.2 ° In practice all judges
so far have been citizens of the Member States, and an informal agree-
ment between the Member governments as to the principle of allocating
judgeships to the six Member States, which will be discussed later,
makes it very unlikely that in the foreseeable future a controversy will
arise as to the appointment of a justice who is not the national of a
Member State.
15. The qualifications for appointment to the now defunct Permanent Court of
International Justice and the Central American Court of Justice were similar. See
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 34, 38-41 (1944).
16. ECSC Treaty, art. 32. This article was amended when the EEC and
Euratom Treaties came into force. The judges were Jaques Rueff and Joseph
Serrarens.
17. Cf., BA4CHLP, Diz RECHTSSTELLUNG DER RIcHTER AM GtRICHTSHOP DXR
EUROPAEISCHEN GpMEINSCHATEN 31-32 (1961).
18. Euratom Treaty, art. 126(1) ; EEC Treaty, art. 157(1) ; ECSC Treaty,
art. 9(3).
19. BAECHLE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 41-48. For other writers see fn. 76.
20. Article 28a. For the text of the personnel statutes see 5 Amtsblatt, 1385/62-
1460/62, June 14, 1962.
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The term of office of the judges is six years and re-appointment
at the end of the term is permissible. A partial renewal of the Court
takes place every three years which affects three or four judges alter-
nately. The three judges whose term of office expired at the end of
the first term were chosen by lot.2 1
The length of tenure for the judges of the Court of the European
Communities compares unfavorably with that of the International
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. The statutes of the latter two courts provide for a
tenure of nine years.2 Only in the case of the former Central American
Court of Justice did the judges of an international tribunal have a
slightly shorter term of office than six years. 23 The relatively short
period of service provided by the Treaties for the members of the Court
has been criticised as tending to weaken the independence of the judges,
and it has been asserted that the tenure provisions might reflect a desire
on the part of the Member governments to preserve a degree of influence
over the members of the Court.24 This problem will be examined in
greater detail subsequently.
The judges are appointed by the governments of the Member
States "acting in common agreement. '25 This means that each of the
six governments has a right of veto against the nomination of a judge
by another government of the Member States. There is no knowledge
that this veto has been used so far, and the fear of retaliation against
future nominations makes it very unlikely that any of the six govern-
ments will ever exercise this right of veto.28
The judges elect by secret ballot from among their members the
president of the Court for a term of three years and this term is renew-
able. However, the first president of the Court of the Coal and Steel
Community was not to be elected, but appointed by the Member govern-
ments, and the same procedure was prescribed and used for the selection
of the first president of the Court of the European Communities.27
21. Euratom Treaty, art. 139 (1-2); EEC Treaty, art. 167 (1-2) ; ECSC Treaty,
art. 32b (1-2).
22. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 13; Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 13.
23. The term was five years. See HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 25.
24. Stein, op. cit. supra note 7, at 69.
25. Euratom Treaty, art. 139(1); EEC Treaty, art. 167(1); ECSC Treaty,
art. 32b(1).
26. See also BAXcHLE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 61-62.
27. See Euratom Treaty, art. 139(5) ; EEC Treaty, art. 167(5) ; ECSC Treaty,
art. 32b(5), in connection with Section 5(1) of the Convention containing the Transi-
tional Provisions (ECSC Treaty) and Euratom Treaty, art. 212(1); EEC Treaty,
art. 244(1) ; ECSC Treaty, arts. 10-11.
The president performs important functions. Besides directing the work of the
Court and presiding over its sessions and deliberations, the president possesses other
significant powers. He may suspend the forced execution of a judgment of the Court
or of a decision of the Communities' executive organs imposing pecuniary obliga-
[VOL. 9 : p. 37
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Thirteen judges have been members of the Court since its inception
in 1952; two of them, Mr. Louis Delvaux of Belgium and Mr. Ch.
Leon Hammes of Luxembourg have served the Court continuously
until the present. Three of the justices of the original Court, Mr.
Massimo Pilotti of Italy, the first president, Mr. Joseph Serrarens and
Mr. Adrianus van Kleffens, both from the Netherlands, served until
1958. When the Court of the European Communities came into being,
they were replaced by Mr. A. M. Donner, a Dutchman, who was ap-
pointed president of the Court, and by Mr. Rino Rossi and Mr. Nicola
Catalano, both of Italy. The latter was succeeded in March of 1962
by Mr. Alberto Trabucchi, also of Italy, and two months later, Mr.
Jacques Rueff, a member of the original Court, 28 was replaced by Mr.
Robert Lecourt, his compatriot. Finally, Mr. Otto Riese, the German
member of the original Court, was succeeded in April 1963 by his
fellow countryman, Mr. Walter Strauss. Thus today the Court is com-
posed of the following justices: Donner, Delvaux, Hammes, Rossi,
Trabucchi, Lecourt, and Strauss.2
The appointments of the judges over the last ten years reveal an
interesting pattern of informal allocation of judgeships to different
countries and the special weight apparently attributed to the office of
the president. When Mr. Pilotti was president of the Court, Italy had
only one judge and the Netherlands had two. However, when Mr.
Donner became the president, the ratio between the two countries was
reversed. While France, Germany, and Belgium have been allotted
only one judgeship, they are compensated by the allocation of one
advocate-general each to France and Germany and by the assignment
of the post of registrar of the Court to Belgium.80 Only Luxembourg,
tions on private persons. He may grant a stay in the execution of an action against
which an appeal has been lodged with the Court, and he may issue interim orders.
However, such rulings of the president are provisional and in no way prejudge the
decisions of the Court on the substance of the matter before it. (Compare Protocol
on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community, art. 36 [herein-
after cited as Statute of the Court] with EEC Treaty, arts. 185-87, 192. Similar
provisions are found in the other Treaties. See also RULtS or PROCEDURE Or THE
COURT Or JUSTIcE, art. 6 [hereinafter cited as RuLEs or PROCEDURE].) Outside the
realm of the Court, the president performs a very influential function by presiding
over the "Committee of the Presidents" of the Coal and Steel Community. This
committee is composed of the presidents of the Court, the High Authority, the
Assembly, and the Council. It plays a very prominent role in the fiscal and per-
sonnel administration of that Community. ECSC Treaty, art. 78(3).
28. Mr. Rueff as well as Mr. Hammes and Mr. Serrarens are the judges of the
original Court who were chosen by lot to serve only three years in their first terms.
Although Mr. Serrarens was reappointed in 1955 for a term of six years, he served
only three years of this term since he was not taken over into the Court of the
European Communities in 1958.
29. Delvaux, Hammes, and Catalano were the first "three-year" judges of the
Court of the European Communities. Delvaux, Hammes, and Trabucchi, the replace-
ment for Catalano, are now slated to serve until September 1967. The terms of the
other judges of the Court expire in October 1964.
30. The advocates-general are Mr. Maurice Lagrange of France and Mr. Karl
Roemer of Germany. The registrar is Mr. Albert van Houtte. All have served from
1952 until now.
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as the smallest country of the six, has been allotted merely one
judgeship.
An informal agreement among the six governments as to the
distribution of the posts of presidents between the executive organs
and the Court also has a bearing on the pattern of positions within the
Court. At the present time, the presidency of the EEC Commission
is held by a German, the presidency of the Euratom Commission by a
Frenchman, the chief executive of the High Authority is an Italian,
and the president of the Court a national of the Netherlands. When
after the expiration of Mr. Donner's first term as president the sug-
gestion was made to nominate Mr. Riese, the German judge, as a
candidate for this post, some of the governments of the Member States
objected, even though according to the Treaties the president should be
"elected" by the judges of the Court, and Mr. Riese might have had
the necessary votes for his election. However, the election of Mr. Riese
as the Court's president would have obviously disturbed the agreed
patterns within the Court and among the major organs of the Com-
munities and thus, for political reasons, the choice of nominees for the
presidency of the Court was extremely restricted.81
From the foregoing it becomes quite obvious that the governments
of the Member States have, in practice, the exclusive power of appoint-
ing their nationals to the positions on the Court allotted to them. This
system resembles to some extent that of the defunct Central American
Court of Justice under which the legislatures of each of the five par-
ticipating states appointed one judge to the Court.12 It contrasts with
the method of selecting the judges for the International Court of Jus-
tice; they are elected by the United Nations General Assembly and the
Security Council from a list of candidates nominated by "national
groups" and not by the governments. 8
Since the Treaties specify that the "governments" appoint the
judges, the basic decision for the selection of a prospective justice is
made by the cabinet in power in the Member State which has to fill
an actual or future vacancy on the Court. In contrast to the practice
in the Member States no participation by the parliament or any other
governmental or political unit or the highest courts is required. The
procedures to be utilized for the selection of an individual to serve as
a judge of the Court are entirely within the discretion of the govern-
ment. The assumption is justified that in essence the selection of a
31. Cf., Nieue Rotterdamse Courant, October 12, 1961.
32. HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 24.
33. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 4. For details regarding the
complicated process of nomination see ROSINNZ, THn INTERNATIONAL COURT OP
JUSTICE 122-25 (1961). The appointment process at the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice was similar.
[VOL. 9: p. 37
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judge is a political decision although considerations regarding the
professional qualifications of the candidate for judgeship necessarily
play a very large or possibly predominant role. The fact that the ap-
pointing government is guided by political motives and will attempt
to select a candidate from its own ranks, is in itself of course neither
unusual nor contemptible provided that the candidate is fully qualified. 4
Nevertheless, the danger exists that the criterion of party affiliation
might be more important for an appointment than professional quali-
fication, or that a less than fully qualified individual will be appointed
who, for domestic political reasons, is to be removed from his position
within the governmental structure of his country, but who, for public
relations reasons, must be given a new billet which has the appearance
of a promotion. 35
The detailed procedures employed by the governments of the
Member States for the selection of the judges for the Court vary from
country to country. Since the last two judges appointed were Mr.
Lecourt and Mr. Strauss it might be of interest to describe briefly the
selection procedures used by the French and German governments.
In France the Foreign Minister has currently the primary re-
sponsibility for the selection of a justice of the Court, but he must con-
sult the Minister of Justice before making the selection. The final
decision rests with the Cabinet. The political parties are neither con-
sulted nor informed, nor is there any consultation regarding the pro-
posed candidate with any professional group such as the bar association
or association of judges. Considered for selection are professors of
public or economic law and justices of the highest courts in France
such as the Conseil d'Etat, Cour de Cassation, or the Court of Appeals
in Paris, but other eminent personalities with legal background are also
eligible. Mr. Lecourt was such a personality; he held the position of
Minister of Justice in France several times during the period from
1948 to 1958.36
According to current appointment procedures in the Federal Re-
public of Germany suggestions of candidates for the judgeship at the
Court are normally made by the Ministries of Justice, Economics, and
34. Mr. Catalano's resignation and Mr. Trabucchi's appointment in 1962 is said
to have been strongly motivated by political considerations. Mr. Trabucchi's brother
was then Minister of J stice in Rome and Mr. Catalano's re-appointment in the fall
of 1961 is supposed to have been made with the understanding that he would resign
within a few months in order to make Mr. Trabucchi's appointment possible (Nieue
Rotterdamse Courant, October 12, 1961; France Industrielle, December 26, 1961).
35. Cf., BAECHLF, op. cit. supra note 17, at 61-62; Zweigert, Einpfiehlt es sich,
Bestimmungen ueber den Rechstschutz zu aendern?, paper presented in Cologne at
the Conference 10 Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerischsthofs der Europaeischen Gemein-
schaften, April 24-26, 1963 (paper as yet ynpublished.)
36. Information obtained from the Legal Service of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs during the writer's visit to Paris in July of 1963.
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Scientific Research. A provisional decision is then made by the Cabinet
which is transmitted to the Court for informal approval and after that
to the governments of the other Member States for their consent. At
this time, the parliamentary groupings of all parties are also informed,
but it is not clear what would be done in case of any objections from
any of the parties. Finally, the official Federal Guild of Lawyers
(Rechtsanwaltkammer) and the Association of Judges and State Prose-
cutors is advised. In the case of the appointment of Mr. Strauss, in-
formal sounding out of potential candidates was under way at the
Ministry of Justice and possibly the Ministry of Economics since the
former Federal Finance Minister Starke seemed to be interested in the
judgeship. As soon as the decision was made by the Cabinet to appoint
Mr. Strauss, all other efforts ceased and no other formal nominations
were made. Apparently the political parties agreed, and no adverse
criticism was voiced in the news media although Strauss had been
implicated in the Spiegel affair of October, 1962 because he failed to
inform his superior, Minister Stammberger, of the proceedings planned
against the editors of that magazine.3
III.
TERMINATION OF OFFICE
The office of a judge of the Court is terminated at the expiration
of his term unless re-appointed; in addition, it may be terminated by
the death of a judge or by his resignation. In the latter two cases, the
successor holds office only during the unexpired period of his prede-
cessor's term, as otherwise the rhythm of the partial renewal of the
Court would be disturbed."' In the event of resignation, the retiring
judge must continue to perform his duties until his successor assumes
office.89 During the first decade of the Court's existence, several judges
have resigned from the bench; they are Mr. Catalano of Italy, Mr. Rueff
of France, and Mr. Riese of Germany. Mr. Pilotti, the first president
of the Court, and Mr. van Kleffens were not re-appointed at the expira-
tion of their terms. Mr. Serrarens, who was one of the original three-
year appointees of the Court of the Coal and Steel Community, received
a second full term but could not serve out his six years since he was
37. Information obtained by the writer from the Ministry of Justice in Bonn
during a visit in June of 1963. See also Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung, December
20, 1962; Deutsche Zeitung, October 13, 1962, February 2, 1963.
38. See discussion of this point supra.
39. Cf., Statute of the Court, arts. 5, 7 (EEC Treaty) ; Protocol on the Statute
of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy Community, arts. 5, 7 [here-
inafter cited as Statute of the Court] ; Protocol on the Code of the Court of Justice,
arts. 6, 8 [hereinafter cited as Statute of the Court.] (These statutes are contained in
a special convention attached to the Treaties.) With regard to the "right" of resigna-
tion see BAUCnrHL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 68.
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not appointed again when the Court of the European Communities came
into being in 1958. All three men were willing to continue serving on
the Court, although Mr. Pilotti was in his late seventies.
Dismissal of a judge from office can be effected only if he "no
longer fulfills the conditions required for . . . [his] office or cannot
meet anymore the obligations resulting from . . . [his] office." 4 It
is interesting to note that the Statutes of the Court attached to the
EEC and Euratom Treaties are more specific than the Statute of the
ECSC Treaty which only speaks of non-fulfillment of the required
conditions. Another more serious divergence in the texts of the Statutes
of the Court is found in the provisions pertaining to the body which
makes the decision regarding the incapacity of the judge. According
to the Statutes attached to the EEC and Euratom Treaties this decision,
which must be made by unanimous vote, has to be made by the judges
and advocates-general. Under the Statute attached to the ECSC Treaty
only the judges participate in this decision." This dilemma could be
solved easily by applying the principle of "lex posterior derogat legi
priori," were it not for article 232 of the EEC Treaty. This article
states that the provisions of that Treaty shall not affect those of the
ECSC Treaty, "in particular in regard to the rights and obligations of
Member States, the powers of the institutions of the said Community
and the rules laid down by the said Treaty for the functioning of the
common market for coal and steel." Since article 232 of the EEC
Treaty is obviously concerned primarily with the continuation of the
power relationships between the institutions of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity and the Member States, as well as with the continued operation
of the coal and steel market, the application of the principle of lex
posterior cannot be viewed as entirely excluded, especially in cases
where the non-application of this principle would result in an impossible
situation. It is inconceivable that the Court should operate under two
conflicting rules with respect to the dismissal of a judge and therefore,
under the principle of lex posterior, the provisions of the Statutes at-
tached to the EEC and Euratom Treaties must be considered as apply-
ing exclusively as far as they are in conflict with previous regulations
of the Statute of the ECSC Treaty.4 2
40. Statute nf the Court, art. 6 (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 6
(EEC Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 7 (ECSC Treaty) ; pertaining to the same
matter is slightly different.
41. Ibid.
42. See also BAECHLZ, op. cit. supra note 17, at 73-74. Cf., DAI, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 158, and the conclusions of Advocate-General Lagrange in Fgdgration
Charbonniore de Belgique (No. 8/55) July 16, 1956, 2 Sammlung 197, 267, in which
Mr. Lagrange emphasizes that the endeavors for reaching compromises in the draft-
ing of international treaties often result in contradictory and unclear texts of the
treaties.
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Although the judge concerned does not participate in the delibera-
tions regarding his dismissal, he must be invited by the president of
the Court to appear before the other judges and advocates-general in
closed session and to offer any statements or explanations. In the event
that the Court decides to remove the judge from office, the registrar
of the Court notifies the presidents of the other major organs of the
Communities such as the Parliament, the executive organs, and the
Council of Ministers. This notification constitutes the vacation of
office;4" the dismissed judge does not continue to hold office until his
successor assumes his duties."
IV.
DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES
As is the usual custom for international as well as national courts,
each judge, before undertaking his duties, must swear an oath "to
perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the
secrecy of the Court's deliberations. 45 The oath may be sworn in the
form prescribed by the national law of the individual judge. It is taken
during the first public session of the Court and, according to the practice
developed over the years, has become the center of a festive ceremony
in which members of the Luxembourg government, high officials of
the three Communities, and representatives of the bar associations in
the Member States participate.
Immediately after a judge has been sworn in, he must make a
solemn declaration that, both during and after his term of office, he
will "respect the obligations resulting therefrom, in particular the duty
of exercising honesty and discretion as regards the acceptance, after
• . . [his] term of office, of certain functions and advantages."46 In
addition to the obligations contained in his oath, namely impartiality,
conscientiousness, and the preservation of secrecy with regard to the
deliberations of the Court, the judge has other duties as well. In order
to ensure that the judge will devote all his efforts to the Court, he
must reside at the seat of the Court which is Luxembourg.47 For the
43. Statute of the Court, art. 6 (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 6
(EEC Treaty) ; RULES Olt PROCEDURE, art. 5, Amtsblatt, January 18, 1960.
44. Statute of the Court, art. 5(3) (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court,
art. 5(3) (EEC Treaty).
45. Statute of the Court, art. 2 (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 2
(EEC Treaty) ; RULES olt PROCEDURE, 3 (1-2). The oath does not constitute an
essential part of the judge's appointment; rather, it is an obligation arising from this
appointment. For details regarding this issue see BAECHLZ, op. cit. supra note 17, at 81.
46. Statute of the Court, art. 4 (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 4
(EEC Treaty) ; RULSS oF PROCEDURE, 3(3). This declaration was not required
under the Statute of the Court of the ECSC Treaty.
47. Statute of the Court, art. 13 (Euratom Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 13
(EEC Treaty); Statute of the Court, art. 9 (ECSC Treaty). In view of the
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same reason as well as for the sake of impartiality, he may not hold
any political and administrative office, nor is he permitted to engage
in any paid or unpaid professional activities except by special exemption
granted by the Council of Ministers. Finally, for the purpose of safe-
guarding his impartiality and conscientiousness, a judge may not par-
ticipate in the settlement of any case in which he has previously partici-
pated as a representative, counsel, or advocate of one of the parties, or
on which he has been previously called upon to decide as a member of
a tribunal, or a commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity. In
cases of difficulties in the application of these provisions the Court is
requested to make a decision.4"
The obligations of the judges under the Statute of the Court of
the ECSC Treaty are somewhat broader and in some respects more
specific. They are not only prohibited from engaging in professional
activities, but also in business activities and, in particular, "they may
not acquire or hold, directly or indirectly, any interest in any business
related to coal or steel during their term of office and during a period
of three years thereafter."49 Since these provisions are not in conflict
with the Statutes of the Court of the EEC and Euratom Treaties, one
must conclude that they are still in effect. The framers of these
Statutes seem to have purposely omitted the detailed restraints as
specified in the ECSC Statute because of the much larger scope of the
EEC and Euratom Treaties and instead used a more general formula
to fix the duties of the judges of the Court. However, there seems to
have been no intention to abrogate the specific provisions of the ECSC
Statute of the Court.50 As a consequence, a newly appointed judge is
obligated to dispose of any shares of steel or coal enterprises that he or
possibly his family may own when entering office.
The Treaties endow the judges with certain specific immunities
and privileges. First, in order to strengthen their independence and
impartiality, the justices of the Court are granted immunity from legal
process; this immunity continues after the expiration of their term with
regard to any acts performed by them in their official capacity including
anything that they may have spoken or written. This immunity, how-
ever, may be lifted by the Court sitting in plenary session. In that
difficult housing situation in Luxembourg, this requirement may result in temporary
separation of the judge from his family.
48. Statute of the Court, arts. 4, 16 (Euratom Treaty); Statute of the Court,
arts. 4, 16 (EEC Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 19 (ECSC Treaty). The statute
of the International Court of Justice contains similar provisions.
49. Statute of the Court, art. 4 (Euratom Treaty); Statute of the Court, art. 4
(EEC Treaty).
50. Cf., BAECHLE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 102-04, who quotes BUNDtSTAG, Doc.
No. 3440/57, regarding the intention of the framers of the EEC and Euratom Treaties.
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event, penal action may be brought against a judge, but such a case is
justiciable within any of the Member States only before the tribunal
competent to try judges of the "highest national judiciary."51 The sus-
pension of the immunity from legal process appears to be limited to
penal action, and is not permitted if civil actions such as breach of
contract or defamation are involved.5 2
Second, the judges of the Court, as all civil servants of the Com-
munities, enjoy in each of the Member States exemption from any
national tax on their salaries. 53 They may also import free of duty
their household effects when taking up their position in Luxembourg,
and may remove them free of tax to their own country at the end of
their term of office. Furthermore, neither they nor their families are
to be subjected to any immigration restrictions or formalities. 54
Third, the judges, as civil servants in a broad sense, seem to
benefit from a provision in the personnel statutes of the Communities
which requires each institution to furnish assistance to their civil
servants in case of threats, insults, libel, and other attacks that may be
aimed at them or their families because of their official positions or
their official activities. The Communities are obliged to compensate the
affected civil servant for damages suffered unless he can obtain indem-
nification from the malefactor. 55 This provision may contribute, in a




Although the maximization of judicial independence is a recognized
goal for both national and international courts, the attainment of this
goal is generally more complicated in the case of a multi-national
judiciary. Without a lengthy term of office, preferably life tenure,
decent remuneration, and stringent safeguards against arbitrary re-
moval, judicial independence is likely to be an empty phrase. In addi-
tion, the judges must be individuals who have no other occupation,
51. Statute of the Court, art. 3 (Euratom Treaty); Statute of the Court, art. 3
(EEC Treaty). The ECSC Statute is similar.
52. VALIZNTINZ, op. fit. supra note 5, at 44.
53. Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Community, llc [herein-
after cited as Privileges and Immunities] (ECSC Treaty) ; Protocol on the Privileges
and Immunities of the European Economic Community, art. 12 [hereinafter cited as
Privileges and Immunities] (EEC Treaty).; Protocol on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the European Atomic Energy Community, art. 12 [hereinafter cited as
Privileges and Immunities] (Euratom Treaty). The Communities themselves, hqw-
ever, now levy a small tax on the salaries paid by them to their civil servants.
54. Privileges and Immunities, art. llc-d (Euratom Treaty) ; Privileges and
Immunities, art. llc-d (EEC Treaty); Privileges and Immunities, art. llc-d
(ECSC Treaty).
55. Personnel Statutes, art. 24.
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and thus will be able to devote their full time to the discharge of their
judicial responsibility. Finally, the methods of selection have a signifi-
cant bearing on the judges' independence. Possibly, the problem of
selection has caused more difficulty than any other in the staffing of
international tribunals.
How strongly is judicial independence institutionalized in the
Court of Justice of the European Communities? According to the
Treaties the judges shall be chosen from among persons of "indis-
putable independence," and they must swear that they will perform their
duties "impartially and conscientiously."5 These requirements, how-
ever, are primarily programmatic exhortations and guidelines; they
cannot assure a judge's independence.
On the other hand, some of the provisions of the Treaties fulfill
certain of the criteria put forth above, and thus -contribute materially
to the strengthening of judicial independence. The judges cannot be
removed from office except by their peers and then only when they "no
longer fulfill the required conditions or meet the obligations of their
office." '57 Although this is a flexible clause, one can trust the other
judges to apply it with the utmost care and diligence since it is an
extraordinary remedy. The judges are not permitted to engage in
activities that may distract them from their main task at the Court.
They are barred from participating in any case with which they have
previously been concerned as agent or counsel for one of the parties or
as a member of a tribunal or commission of inquiry. And a novel,
but highly commendable principle introduced by the framers of the
Treaties makes it impossible for a party to a litigation to invoke either
the nationality of a judge, or the absence from the bench of a judge
of the party's own nationality as grounds to request a change in the
composition of the Court or one of its chambers. 5
The salaries of the judges of the Court exceed those normally paid
in Continental Europe for such positions, and their size can be assumed
to bolster judicial independence. The base pay of the judges is dollars
12,000, that of the president of the Court dollars 15,000. The judges
also receive a quarters allowance amounting to fifteen per cent of their
salaries and a special expense allowance which is ten per cent of the
base pay for the judges and twenty per cent for the president of the
Court. Moreover, provisions are made for free accident insurance as
56. Euratom Treaty, art. 139; EEC Treaty, art. 167; ECSC Treaty, art. 32b.
Statute of the Court, art. 2 (Euratom Treaty); Statute of the Court, art. 2 (EEC
Treaty); Statute of the Court, art. 2 (ECSC Treaty).
57. Statute of the Court, art. 6 (EEC Treaty).
58. Statute of the Court, art. 16(4) (Euratom Treaty); Statute of the Court,
art. 16(4) (EEC Treaty) ; Statute of the Court, art. 19 (ECSC Treaty).
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well as retirement and other social security benefits. When a judge is
not reappointed he is entitled to a separation allowance which consists of
fifty per cent of his last salary to be paid for a period of three years. 9
The salaries and other benefits are not paid to the judges by their
national governments (as was the case, for instance, with the judges
of the defunct Central American Court of Justice) but by the three
Communities which share these expenditures-another factor that tends
to strengthen the independence of the justices.6"
Despite these favorable provisions of the Treaties, the independ-
ence of the judges of the Court was questioned even before the Court
came into being in 195261, and a certain amount of criticism in this
respect has continued until today. 2 This criticism centers primarily
on the relatively short period of the judges' tenure and the methods
of appointment and re-appointment, which, as has been pointed out
earlier, lie entirely within the discretion of the governments of the
Member States. Since for re-appointment the justices are exclusively de-
pendent upon their own governments, which are often parties to disputes
before the Court, they may be tempted, on occasion, to let thoughts of
the future color their thoughts of the present. If a judge should be denied
re-appointment by his government, he might be without employment
for some time or may have to accept a much less desirable position than
the one from which he resigned in order to enter the service of the
Communities. Mr. Etienne Hirsch's failure to be re-appointed by the
French government to the presidency of the Euratom Commission after
his first term expired in January of 1962,63 and the fact that some of
the judges of the Coal and Steel Community Court were replaced when
it became the Court of the three Communities, undoubtedly are remem-
bered by the justices of the Court. 4 Fortunately, for the protection of
the judges' independence, the Treaties and the Statutes of the Court
make no provision for dissenting opinions to the decisions of the Court.
While sound arguments can be made for the publication of dissenting
opinions as having a salutary influence upon the jurisdiction of the
Court, 5 it may also lead to an emergence of national interests within
59. BAXCHLE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 130-31.
60. Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Com-
munities, art. 6; cf., HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 24-25.
61. Cf., MASON, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, EXPERIMENT IN
SUPRANATIONALISM 25 (1955), who cites the debates in French Economic Council
in 1951.
62. E.g., DELVAUX, op. cit. supra note 5, at 15; HAMMES, CONGRtSSO INTXR-
NATIONALE DXI MAGISTRATI, Roma, October 13, 1958, 145; ZWXIGERT, op. cit. supra
note 35.
63. See EURATOM COMMISSION, DISCOURS DS M. ETIENNE HIRSCH, PRtSIDENT
D8 LA COMMISSION D9VANT L'AssEMBLrn EUROPP9N A STRASBOURG (December, 1961).
64. Riese, Erfahrungen aus der Praxis des Gerichtshofs der Europaeischen
Gerneinschaft fuer Kohle und Stahl, DEUTSCHZ RICHT4RZEITUNG (1958), 270, 271.
65. Cf., ZWIG4RT, op. cit. supra note 35; Riese, op. cit. supra note 64, at 272.
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the Court, which would not only be detrimental to the independence
and impartiality of the judges, but possibly also to the authority of
the Court.66
Judge Riese declared, in 1958, that fears the short term of
office and the appointment procedure for the judges would endanger
their independence, have proved to be unfounded. He stated that "in
no case have the judges been guided by extraneous, political or national-
istic viewpoints." 7 In all likelihood, the statement applies just as much
to the present judges as it did when Mr. Riese wrote these words. Yet
from an institutional point of view, the danger to the independence of
the Court's judges continues to exist until the provisions of the Treaties
with regard to the length of their terms of office and the methods of
their appointments have been changed in such a manner as to fully
insure their independence.
A number of valid proposals to attain this objective have been
made. With regard to the term of office, it has been suggested that the
judges should be appointed either for life or at least for twelve years
with-payment of their full salaries for life. With regard to the method
of appointment, it has been proposed to establish a selection committee
within the European Parliament or to have this Parliament elect the
judges from a list submitted by the governments of the Member States.
Another proposal advocates the selection of new judges for position
vacancies by the Court itself, possibly from a list prepared by the highest
courts in the Member States. In this manner the highest quality of
the judges would be assured since normally members of the highest
courts are in the best position to evaluate the qualifications of candi-
dates for judgeships. The least desirable proposal appears to be the
adoption of the system used by the International Court of Justice at The
Hague since it is extremely complicated and cumbersome.68 To put
into effect any of the above proposals requires a revision of the
Treaties. However, the political relations existing at present between
the Member States make any revision of the Treaties in the near
future a very unlikely undertaking since it is doubtful that agreement
by all Member governments on the solution of controversial problems
could be reached.
66. Accord, Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY or NEW YORK 232, 234 (May,
1962) ; BAECHLE, Op. cit. supra note 17, at 85.
67. Riese, op. cit. supra note 64, at 271. See also Daig, Die vier ersten Urteile
des Gerichtshofs der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft fuer Kohle und Stahl, 361, 373,
JURIST4ENZEITUNG (1955). But see HAMMES, op. cit. supra note 63, at 145.
68. For fuller information see BAECHLE, op. cit. supra note 17 at 57-62, 126-30
who cites other proposals; also ZWEIGERT, op. cit. supra note 3 , at 9-10; EURO-
PAEISCHES PARLAMENT, Bericht des Politischen Ausschusses ueber die Zustandigkeiten
und Befugnisse des Europaeischen Parlaments, Doc. No. 143, 25, June 14, 1963.
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VI.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGES
The extensive powers which the justices of the Court of the Euro-
pean Communities hold in their hands makes it essential to inquire as
to what sort of men have become justices of that Court and of its
predecessor, the Court of the Coal and Steel Community. After all,
there is little question that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties and the legal rules derived from them, the backgrounds and
economic and political philosophies of the judges are likely to be re-
flected in the Court's decisions whenever the possibility of choice from
among a number of legally acceptable principles presents itself.
In keeping with the provisions of the ECSC Treaty, that judges
of the Court did not need to be jurists,"9 two of the original members
of the Court lacked a formal legal education. These gentlemen were
Mr. Serrarens and Mr. Rueff. All the other judges had completed their
formal law studies, two of them, Mr. Donner and Mr. Trabucchi, re-
ceiving their doctor of law degrees cum laude.
Of the academically trained jurists who have served on the Court,
three judges, or less than thirty per cent of the justices, seem to have
had substantial previous experience on the bench. They are Justices
Hammes, Riese, and Rossi. Mr. Pilotti, Mr. van Kleffens, and Mr.
Strauss also have had judicial experience, but their careers as judges
appear to have been rather limited. Four of the judges have practiced
law or acted as legal counsel to private enterprises or public organiza-
tions. They are Catalano, Delvaux, Lecourt and van Kleffens, but
none of them seem to have been a practitioner recently. Five of the
justices have been professors of law; while for Justices Hammes and
Catalano the academic careers appeared to have played only a minor
role. Justices Donner, Riese, and Trabucchi have distinguished them-
selves as academicians and have occupied positions of leadership in
legal societies and conferences. Finally, four of the judges, Hammes,
Catalano, Rossi, and Pilotti, performed for short periods of time the
functions of prosecutor in their respective countries.
It is interesting to note that several judges occupied important
executive and administrative positions. Delvaux was for a short time
Belgian Minister of Agriculture in 1946. Lecourt held several times
during the period from 1948 to 1958 the post of Minister of Justice
and was from 1959 to 1961 French Minister of State for Aid and
Cooperation between France and the Member States of the French
Community, and later for the Overseas Departments and Territories.
69. ECSC Treaty, art. 32, prior to its amendment in 1958.
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Strauss was Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry of Justice for
more than twenty years before being appointed to the Court of Justice.
Riese was also a high official in the German Ministry of Justice, but his
service was performed during the late 1920's. Van Kleffens held high
positions in the Dutch Ministry of Economics, and Catalano occupied
several governmental posts in Italy. Justice Pilotti was an Italian
delegate to a number of international conferences, and was Assistant
Secretary-General of the League of Nations from 1932 until 1937. Mr.
Rueff, a "non-jurist," had a strong administrative background; he held
several very important posts in the French Ministry of Finance and in
1926 was Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of Mr. Poincar6. He was
sous-gouverneur of the Bank of France in 1939 and was a member of
the French delegation to the United Nations. In addition, he has been
a professor at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques.
Several of the judges of the Court have-been quite active in politics.
Mr. Delvaux has been a deputy of the Belgian Chamber of Repre-
sentatives from 1936 to 1946. Judge Lecourt has been a member of
the French Assembly from 1945 to 1958 and has been president of the
parliamentary group of the Popular Republican Party (MRP) several
times. He was also a member of the executive committee of the Euro-
pean Movement. Finally, Mr. Serrarens, another "non-jurist," was
a member of the Dutch Senate in 1929 and was a deputy in the Assem-
bly of the Netherlands from 1937 to 1952. In addition, he has partici-
pated in many international labor conferences and has long been active
in the international labor movement. He was Secretary-General of the
International Confederation of Christian Unions from 1920 until 1952.
Mr. Strauss participated in the organization of the local Christian
Democratic Party in Berlin, but later efforts to become elected to the
German Parliament were unsuccessful. He has also been president of
the politically influential Protestant Working Group of the Christian
Democratic Party.70
This variety of backgrounds of the justices of the Court revealed
by this brief survey is surprising; especially when one considers that in
France, Germany, and many other countries on the Continent of Europe
most judges are professionally trained and rise through a career service
to the highest judical positions in their countries. In the United States,
a great deal of attention has been focused in recent years upon the
question of whether individuals should have experience on the bench
before they are considered eligible for appointment to the Supreme
70. The material on the background of the judges is taken from ANNUAIRE-
MANUEL DU PARLEMENT EUROP SN 1961-1962, 109-12 (1962) ; NoTicE BIoGRAPHIQUi
SUR LES MXMBRES DE LA COUR (1954); DXR SP14GgL, January 24, 1962, pp. 24-34;
Weser-Kurier (Bremen) November 7, 1962.
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Court. Professor John R. Schmidhauser, in his study of the politics and
personalities of the members of the United States Supreme Court comes
to the conclusion that "there is little in the history of the Supreme
Court to suggest that justices with prior judicial experience were more
objective or better qualified than those who lacked such experience.""
Schmidhauser points out that some of the Court's most distinguished
members, among them Marshall, Taney, Hughes, Brandeis, and Stone,
were totally lacking in this experience before their appointments to
the Supreme Court.
In view of the comprehensive jurisdiction of the Court which
imposes on it the obligation to solve legal problems in the economic,
social, administrative, and even political sphere, the varied backgrounds
and experiences of the judges of the Court may be an advantage.72
Indeed, if the three Communities and their institutions may be viewed
as the possible forerunners of a federal governmental system for the
Member States, the broad knowledge possessed by some of the justices
in the fields of economics, finance, and administration may be a sig-
nificant factor in arriving at decisions which transcend narrow judicial
considerations, and which reflect an application of the Treaties with a
keen eye on the purpose of the Communities and with an appreciation
for the future.73 The assumption is justified that the diversity of inter-
ests, experiences, and values represented in the deliberating sessions of
the Court may have stimulated a fertile interchange of concepts and
ideas and thus broadened the views of the participants. On the other
hand, the exclusive appointment of career judges might have led to
conflicting narrow parochial attitudes among the justices with the
result that some of the judgments might have represented merely com-
promises between national legal doctrines and traditions. 74 Of course,
71. SCHMIDHAUSER, THZ SUPREMZ COURT 54 (1961).
72. In the ratification proceedings of the ECSC Treaty in the German Parliament
one of the deputies stated that "the Court of Justice must not be merely a collection
of lawyers who are strangers to the real world, but of men who are familiar with
actual conditions and who recognize the common interest of the European workers."
BUNDESTAG, OFFICIAL REPORTS 7712 (1951-52).
73. In many decisions the Court has used the purposes of the Treaties as an
important aid in the interpretation of their provisions. See, e.g., Government of the
French Republic v. High Authority, (No. 1/54) December 21, 1954, 1 Sammlung 7,
23 [1954-55].
74. See Riese, op. cit. supra note 64, at 273. In the deliberations of the judges
the language problem has at times been an impediment since the judges of the Court
have not been chosen for their linguistic abilities, but for their knowledge of the law.
Although all documents before the Court are translated into the four official languages
recognized by the Treaties-French, German, Italian, and Dutch-and while a simul-
taneous translation is provided during oral procedures (cf., RuLEs or PRoctoURX,
arts. 29-31), translators are not used during the secret deliberations of the Court
concerning the decision in a case. The practice has been to use the French language
during these deliberations which put at a serious disadvantage those judges whose
mother tongue was not French and who had not mastered the intricacies and nuances
of the French legal jargon. For more information regarding this problem see Riese,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 272, and Baec.hle, op. cit. supra note 17, at 51-55.
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experience on the bench cannot be disregarded as an important quali-
fication for the justices of the Court. The ideal composition of the
Court of the European Communities might be a mixture of both career
judges and men with a thorough legal background that have had
experiences and proven themselves competent in high positions in ad-
ministration, business, and the labor movement.
It might be interesting to speculate as to how much the attitudes of
the judges toward European integration influenced the decisions of the
Court. Since the average age of the judges is almost sixty-one years,7"
most of them have had first-hand experience with the miseries of two
world wars. One may assume, therefore, with some justification that
the judges view a united Europe as a means of preventing the use of
war as an instrument for the settlement of disputes between the Euro-
pean states. In addition, some of the judges participated prominently
in international conferences, held positions with international organi-
zations, and were active in movements for a united Europe. Although
it might be possible to conclude from the experiences of the judges that
a majority, at least, looks with favor upon the political unification of
Europe-which of course would also increase the prestige of the
Court and their positions as judges-there is no indication that such
an attitude has resulted generally in a very strong pro-integrationist
jurisprudence.76 Rather, most of the judgments of the Court reflect a
desire to render decisions which are practicable within the framework
of the Treaties and which take into consideration the sometimes painful
economic changes and dislocations that are being brought about by the
goals and principles set forth in the Treaties. That the Court has
refrained from a very strong pro-integrationist course is a sign of
political wisdom, since such a course might well have aroused vigorous
resentment within the governments of the Member States and among
politically influential economic groups with the result that economic
and especially political integration would actually have been impeded.
The future of the Court, nevertheless, is closely tied to the future
of economic and political integration of the Member States. As inte-
gration progresses, the role of the Court will increase in importance;
at the same time, the growing number of decisions of the Court-
75. The youngest judge. Professor Donner, is the president of the Court. He is
45 years old.
76. An outstanding exception is the Preliminary Decision rendered upon the
request of the Tariff Commission in Amsterdam in the matter of van Gend & Loos,
(No. 26/62) February 5, 1963, 9 Sammlung 1 [1963]. The Court held in this decision
that the prohibition of the EEC Treaty against the introduction of new charges and
customs duties on the trade between the Member States established not only obliga-
tions of the governments of these States, but constituted municipal law within the
Member States which created individual rights of private persons that had to be
observed and safeguarded by the domestic courts of these States.
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nearly eighty cases were pending in the summer of 1963-reflects
confidence in the Court and is therefore a significant factor for the
progress of integration. The increasing workload of the Court may
make it necessary to expand the number of judges in the future. The
Treaties have anticipated this possibility; upon the request of the Court,
the Council of Ministers may by unanimous vote increase the number
of judges. 7 Thus the way is paved for the gradual realization of Jean
Monnet's prediction, made more than ten years ago, that the Court
would eventually become the Supreme Court of a European Federation.
77. Euratom Treaty, art. 137; EEC Treaty, art. 165; ECSC Treaty, art. 32.
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